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1.1 Introduction
Several revolutions in the ﬁeld of economics occurred more or less si-
multaneously during the decades following World War II. One was the dif-
fusion of formal mathematical techniques into economic theory with the
Arrow-Debreu revolution in general equilibrium analysis and the Hicks-
Samuelson revolution, which recast standard economics in a form that
made quantitative analysis possible. At the same time, great advances were
made in econometric analysis as techniques from statistics and agricultural
economics were combined with the functional forms of the mathematical
models. Computing power also increased dramatically during this period.
Last, but certainly not least, the nation’s macroeconomic statistics were
compiled in 1948 into a coherent and internally consistent form in the Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
Many of the contributors to this transformation are Nobel laureates: Si-
mon Kuznets, George Stigler, Milton Friedman, Tjalling Koopmans, and
Richard Stone. Although the contributions of Zvi Griliches were regret-
tably not recognized with a Nobel Prize, he was a ﬁgure of comparable
importance. The signiﬁcance of his early research in the ﬁeld of applied
econometrics and in the study of the factors making for technological
change were recognized in 1965 when he was awarded the John Bates Clark
Medal. His many contributions are reviewed in the last book he completed
before his death in 1999, R&D, Education, and Productivity; they cover a
broad range of subjects but are organized on the central question of how
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The importance of careful measurement is another central theme in
Griliches’s research. This theme permeated his work in speciﬁc areas like
human capital and R&D, and while it did not produce the kind of explicit
results that could be easily assessed, in sum it constituted one of his most
important legacies. Griliches was keenly aware of the injunction by
Tjalling Koopmans (1947) that measurement without theory is to be
avoided and made major contributions to developing the linkages between
the two. His seminal 1967 paper with Dale Jorgenson on the measurement
of productivity change is a virtual manifesto on the need for theory to
guide measurement practice. Yet, at the same time, Griliches was also
deeply concerned about the limitations on empirical work posed by in-
adequate data and the tendency for economists to substitute more theory
for better data when the latter are found wanting. His presidential address
to the American Economic Association (Griliches 1994) is a forceful re-
minder of the danger of theory without measurement in empirical work.
Many others have paid tribute to his contributions to the various topics
on which he worked. I will pay my tribute to his contributions to measure-
ment as a whole and to the importance he attached to the accuracy of eco-
nomic data. In addition to reviewing some of the key issues of the theory-
measurement dichotomy, my remarks will build on this theme by stressing
the essential duality of theory and measurement and argue that this di-
chotomy itself is potentially deceptive. First of all, “getting the data right”
often requires “getting the theory right.” Second, theory and measurement
are not separable aspects of economic activity in the sense that the accu-
racy of the data can aﬀect subsequent economic decisions, and a complete
economic theory must allow for possible feedback eﬀects associated with
inaccurate data. Finally, considerations of political economy come into
play because the accuracy of economic measurement aﬀects policy in a va-
riety of ways, and changes in policy can, in turn, aﬀect economic behavior.
1.2 The Quantitative Transformation
The convergence of theory, statistics, and data in the 1950s and 1960s in-
volved more than the incorporation of new techniques and methods: it also
involved a shift in the sense of what was possible. Koopmans, for example,
starts his famous article on “Measurement without Theory” with the ex-
ample of synergism between the empiricism of Tycho Brahe and the theory
of Johannes Kepler in the development of celestial mechanics. While no
one seriously believed that the laws of economics were as precise as those
of physical science, there was a new sense of the possibilities of quantita-
tive economics and a newfound faith there was enough stability in the
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economics an exact mathematical form. And this translated into a pro-
gram of research that encouraged the partnership of theory and measure-
ment.
This structuralist program is apparent in the development of empirical
demand and production theory, as well as in the theory of growth. The
early phases of this development transformed the largely graphical and
heuristic description of the theory of the consumer and producer into a
corresponding system of structural equations. This was followed by the
eﬀort to express the system in a form suitable for econometric analysis, in
part by assigning speciﬁc functional forms to the demand and production
systems and, more generally, to developing the nonstochastic speciﬁcation
of the system. In the estimation of production and investment functions,
for example, ever more ﬂexible functional forms were developed that al-
lowed for more complex interactions between capital and labor inputs: the
ﬁxed-proportion and Cobb-Douglas forms were generalized into the con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) function (and others), which in turn
yielded to the translog and generalized Leontief forms. Duality theory was
also developed during this period. The stochastic speciﬁcation received
relatively less attention at this time.
Which variables to include in the analysis, and how they should be de-
ﬁned and measured, was also an important part of the nonstochastic spec-
iﬁcation of econometric models. The debate over whether real output
should be measured net or gross of economic depreciation and a parallel
debate over capital were central to the famous exchanges between Jorgen-
son and Griliches (1967, 1972) and Denison (1972). Questions about the
inclusion of research and development and its relation to the multifactor
productivity residual should also be mentioned (Griliches 2000, chapter 4),
as should the role of the Jorgenson (1963) user cost of capital in the ac-
counting system (Christensen and Jorgenson 1969, 1970).
A key insight emerged from these debates: theory and measurement
were “dual” in the sense that a testable theory of economic growth is as-
sociated with a set of data accounts that corresponded to that theory. In
this view, theory and measurement imposed mutual constraints on each
other. This duality is nowhere more apparent than in the fundamental
national income accounting identity between the value of output and the
value of factor input. This identity can be derived from a constant-
returns-to-scale production function using Euler’s theorem and the as-
sumption of marginal cost pricing. Conversely, if one starts with the ac-
counting identity, diﬀerent structures of production are implied
according to how the prices and quantities are actually measured and
interpreted, as well as by what is included in the analysis. This is the
Koopmans’s injunction writ large.
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Unfortunately, the partnership between theory and measurement proved
far from equal, and Griliches devoted a signiﬁcant part of his 1994 presi-
dential address to the American Economic Association to a discussion of
this issue. In a section titled “Data Woes,” he asks the following question:
Why are the data not better? The facts themselves are not in dispute.
Every decade or so a prestigious commission or committee produces a
report describing in detail various data diﬃculties and lacunae.
(Griliches 1994, 14)
He acknowledges that he “really doesn’t have good answers to this ques-
tion,” but goes on to oﬀer three observations. First, “measurement prob-
lems are really hard”; second, economists have little inﬂuence over the bud-
get for data collection activities, and the statistical agencies are balkanized;
and, ﬁnally, speaking of the economics profession:
We ourselves do not put enough emphasis on the value of data and data
collection in our training of graduate students and in the reward struc-
ture of our profession. It is the preparation skill of the chef that catches
the professional eye, not the quality of the materials in the meal, or the
eﬀort that went into procuring them. (Griliches 1994, 14)
This observation is an ironic inversion of Koopmans’s injunction against
“measurement without theory”; it is conceptual ingenuity that builds the
careers of both the brilliant chef and the successful academic. The ingredi-
ents are of secondary importance, and this leads to the risk of too much
theory without measurement, or, more accurately, theory with measure-
ment so long as someone else ﬁnds the ingredients. The published data se-
ries provided by government statistical agencies are, after all, Samuelson-
ian public goods, and academic researchers are aware of the disincentives
associated with the attendant appropriability/free-rider problem.1
This situation is well illustrated by the notoriously hard problems in-
volved in measuring the output of the service-producing sectors of the
economy. Griliches pointed out the true source of the diﬃculty: the inabil-
ity to deﬁne in principle what exactly is meant when we speak of the out-
18 Charles R. Hulten
1. It should be emphasized that the neglect of measurement described by Griliches in the
mid 1990s was relative to the emphasis it received in earlier periods. And many academic
economists, like Griliches, did soldier on despite the diminished interest in measurement by
academic economists as a whole. The Productivity Program at the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, directed by Griliches, and those associated with it deserve special mention
in this regard. The same should be said of the CRIW, which was founded in the 1930s to work
on the conceptual problems associated with the development of the national accounts and
which has continued to promote research on data issues. However, it is also true that during
the period with which Griliches was concerned, publication of data-oriented research in pres-
tigious journals became more diﬃcult, and courses on subjects like national income ac-
counting disappeared from graduate curricula.put of banks, insurance companies, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so on,
which he termed the “hard-to-measure” sectors. It is relatively easy for the-
ory to work with concepts like “real output” in an abstract way, without
having to take on the hard issue of just what it really means or, signiﬁcantly,
to deﬁne the units in which the output of services are to be measured. If
theory fails to help with this problem, how is the statistician to implement
the Koopmans’s injunction? As Griliches puts it:
[I]t is not reasonable for us to expect the government to produce statistics
in areas where concepts are mushy and where there is little professional
agreement on what is to be measured and how. (Griliches 1994, 14)
Moreover, the diﬃculty of linking theory and measurement became pro-
gressively harder as theory evolved. The theoretical models of the early
stages of the Hicks-Samuelson revolution tended to be highly aggregative,
or based on the representative agent, and also tended to assume perfect
competition (e.g., the aggregate production function underlying growth
theory and growth accounting). This made for a tidy paradigm to guide the
development of macroeconomic data, but theory also showed that the con-
ditions that made for exact aggregation were highly unlikely (Fisher 1965).
Subsequent theoretical development took a more disaggregated view of
the world, a world that is inherently more messy, with heterogenous agents
and imperfect information and competition. Correspondingly, interest
in measurement issues became more “micro” and cross-sectional (panel
data) as well as more ﬁeld speciﬁc. Academic interest in the quality of “oﬃ-
cial” macro statistical series waned, even as empirical work with microeco-
nomic data sets increased. Moreover, the structural parameters of economic
models became harder to identify as these models became more compli-
cated, and the structuralist paradigm of the earlier period was challenged by
reduced-form approaches. The current debate over the interpretation of re-
gression coeﬃcients in the hedonic price model is a recent example of the
tension between the two approaches (Pakes 2003; Hulten 2003).
Thus, the profession’s apparent neglect of data issues was, in part, a shift
in emphasis from macro to micro levels of theory and measurement. Still,
it would be hard to make a persuasive case that the economics profession
placed much priority on its data during this period. As Zvi Griliches (1986)
observed in his contribution to the Handbook of Econometrics, the term
data is the plural form of the Latin word datum, which means “given,” and
one might further say that researchers in this period were generally happy
to be given their data.
1.4 The Greenspan Critique
Both theory and data are important elements in the formulation of mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy. Getting the theory “right” is a priority, as witnessed
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tiques of Friedman [1968] and Lucas [1976] are discussed below). But it is
also important to know what the current rate of inﬂation actually is before
deciding whether policy intervention is needed. It became increasingly ap-
parent to policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s that the lack ofreliable data
was a binding constraint on policy formulation. The most pointed criti-
cism came from Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan in the
mid-1990s. He suggested, in remarks to the Senate Finance Committee in
1995, that the growth rate of the CPI might be biased upward by .5 to 1.5
percentage points per year (Greenspan 1995). This is a very signiﬁcant bias
given that the year-to-year change in the CPI averaged around 3 percent in
the years immediately preceding Greenspan’s remarks. An upward bias of
this magnitude presented a rather diﬀerent picture of price inﬂation and,
as we shall see, had major implications for programs like Social Security,
in which expenditures are indexed for inﬂation using the growth rate of
the CPI.
After a panel of prominent economists concurred with the Greenspan’s
conjecture about 1 percentage point bias, a commission was subsequently
established to investigate further (chaired by Michael Boskin, whose ear-
lier eﬀorts to improve the quality of economic data became known as the
“Boskin Initiative”). The commission, of which Griliches was a member,
also found a bias of around 1 percentage point, and attributed about half
to methodological issues and half to a failure to capture dynamic im-
provements in product quality and the development of new goods.
This second source of bias in the CPI pointed to another dimension of
the Greenspan critique: Greenspan (1998) also questioned the ability of ex-
isting macrodata to represent the true dynamism of the American econ-
omy, citing the implausibly low estimates of real output growth in the ser-
vice sectors of the economy. The NIPA, for example, evolved at a time (the
1930s and 1940s) in which the production of tangible goods in manufac-
turing, agricultural, and natural resource sectors were the major source of
gross domestic product (GDP; according to NIPA estimates, the service
sectors accounted for 36 percent of GDP in 1947, shortly before the NIPA
were launched, and were 56 percent by 1997). With this intersectoral shift
came a shift away from the tangibility of output and toward the hard-to-
measure intangible services where the units of real output, and thus eco-
nomic growth, are hard to pin down.
A similar problem occurs with the measurement of “knowledge” capital
(Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2005). Much of the dynamism of the U.S.
economy is the result of scientiﬁc and technological innovation, which is
reﬂected in the rapid rate of product and process innovation arising from
the commitment of resources to education, research, and development
activities. As with services, the output associated with these activities is
largely intangible and hard to measure: in what units should knowledge be
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successive generations of computers be measured? The Boskin Commis-
sion estimated that half of its CPI bias was due to the mismeasurement of
quality improvement and the introduction of new goods (Boskin et al.
1996), and Shapiro and Wilcox (1996), who produced similar estimates,
likened the measure of quality change to “house-to-house combat.” More-
over, estimates of investment by the U.S. private business sector during the
1990s suggest that expenditures for intangible capital were as large as
spending for ﬁxed capital. The latter is treated as a component of measured
GDP, but intangible investment is not.
The U.S. statistical system has confronted these challenges: changes to
the CPI have reduced the growth rate of the index by around three-quarters
of a percentage point, again a rather sizeable change in percentage terms
and a signiﬁcant proportion of the bias estimated by the Boskin Commis-
sion. Programs have been initiated or planned at the Bureau of Economic
Analysis that are aimed at more accurate measurement of service-sector
output, at improving the way industry output is measured, and, more gen-
erally, at better characterization of the role of knowledge in the evolution
of the economy (quality-adjustment of high-technology goods, capitaliza-
tion of software expenditures, and the prospective incorporation of re-
search and development [R&D] investment into the NIPA). Many of these
changes have been made in the context of a renewed concern for the archi-
tecture or overall design of the statistical system and, in particular, with a
concern for how theory shapes measurement.2
In sum, the years since Greenspan’s critique of the mid-1990s have seen
an acceleration of change in the macrostatistical system along Koopmans-
ian lines. These years have also seen a renewal of the partnership between
theory and measurement, and between academe and the statistical agen-
cies. Though it is diﬃcult to quantify, this renewal is reﬂected in the mem-
bership of the various CPI commissions, in the increased number of con-
ferences and workshops attended by economists from both academe and
the agencies (the CRIW has greatly expanded its activities in this area), and
in the academic membership in agency advisory committees. These trends
are part of the Griliches legacy.
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2. The recent CRIW conference on “A New Architecture for the National Accounts,” or-
ganized by Dale Jorgenson, Steve Landefeld, and William Nordhaus in 2004, is noteworthy
in this regard, as is the paper by Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) presented at an earlier CRIW
conference on “Capital and the New Economy.” It is also worth noting, as a matter of histor-
ical perspective, that the “architecture” of the U.S. NIPA were strongly inﬂuenced by the data
needs associated with the Great Depression and World War II. This inﬂuence left the NIPA
with a distinctly Keynesian personality oriented to accounting for short-run expenditures
ﬂows. As interest shifted toward explaining the high rate of economic growth and innovation
after World War II, growth and production theory became the theoretical paradigms for the
design of the national accounts rather than Keynesian demand-management theory, and the
problems of accounting for capital input and real output assumed a new design priority.1.5 Koopmans Redux
The Koopmans’s injunction is grounded in a view of theory and mea-
surement inspired by the physical sciences: the data associated with a sys-
tem, physical or economic, are a reﬂection of the principles that guide the
evolution of the system, and thus these principles are the ones that must be
used to organize the data used to study the system. However, while the
analogy with physical science is instructive, it is ﬂawed in one important re-
spect. In the physical world, an atom of iron cannot decide to become a
chlorine atom in order to maximize utility; in the economic world, a steel
worker can decide to switch jobs and become a chemical-industry worker
on the basis of the available information about the attractiveness of em-
ployment in the two industries. Moreover, if that information is inaccurate
or erroneous, the error may well end up aﬀecting the worker’s future life.
In other words, there are feedback mechanisms in economic systems
through which measurement error can aﬀect the evolution of the economy.
A complete description of the system must therefore include a theory of
how measurement error and, more generally, how partial or inaccurate in-
formation interacts with the system as a whole.
Two feedback mechanisms are important in this regard. The ﬁrst in-
volves the perception of measurement error on the part of economic agents
and their behavioral reaction. In general, each new round of oﬃcial macro-
statistics adds to the body of past statistics and is interpreted by economic
agents in light of the perceived accuracy of those statistics. Subsequent de-
cisions are based on the interpretation given to each increment to the de-
cision makers’ information set, and data bias can therefore become em-
bedded in the evolution of subsequent behavior.
This behavioral eﬀect can be thought of as an economic bias, and the key
point is that the behavioral bias may be diﬀerent from the underlying sta-
tistical bias. A statistical bias in the CPI might, for example, cause people
to alter their behavior relative to what it would have been if the statistical
bias had been zero, but there is no straightforward link between the size of
the measurement error and the behavioral reaction to it. Indeed, a system-
atic statistical bias in the CPI may not have any economic bias at all if
agents are not “fooled” by the error and therefore do not alter their behav-
ior. This result might seem, at ﬁrst glance, to be counterintuitive, but it is
in fact an extension of the Friedman analysis of the Phillips curve and the
Lucas (1976) critique of policy eﬀectiveness. Friedman and Lucas argued
that a tradeoﬀbetween inﬂation and unemployment assumes a high degree
of consumer ignorance and that rational consumers would “pierce the veil
of money” and focus on the real economy, leaving unemployment un-
changed at its natural rate as inﬂation accelerated. The same logic applies
to measurement errors. If agents are not fooled into changing their behav-
22 Charles R. Hultenior by a policy-induced increase in the rate of inﬂation, they would not be
fooled by an error-induced increase.
As a more concrete example of this critique, suppose that every agent
perceives that the growth of the CPI is biased upward by 1 percentage point
each year and that recipients of cost-of-living wage adjustments (COLAs)
therefore believe that their COLAs overcompensated them for the eﬀects
of price inﬂation. But so would those bargaining with them in wage-setting
negotiations, and the ﬁnal wage bargain might well reﬂect this mutual
knowledge, leaving the total compensation package (basic wage, COLA,
and beneﬁt packages) invariant to the bias. Moreover, if the CPI were re-
turned to its unbiased growth rate on the advice of experts and both sides
perceived the change, the previous total compensation package would be
unchanged even though the components would be adjusted to reﬂect the
new unbiased COLA.
This line of reasoning presumes full rationality and complete informa-
tion. A data bias may have a diﬀerent eﬀect in other models of economic
decision making. If agents are completely ignorant of the 1 percentage
point CPI bias, negotiations would proceed as though the biased COLA
were an accurate compensation for inﬂation, and the bias would not be
oﬀset by a reduction in the other components of total compensation.
Moreover, removing the CPI bias would now aﬀect the distribution of in-
come and most likely change the subsequent evolution of incomes and rel-
ative prices.
The possibility of the endogenous feedback of measurement to theory
implies that the degree of measurement “accuracy” is an organic and non-
separable aspect of the economic system, and the data are not just external
characteristics of the system. This, in turn, opens a new frontier beyond the
Koopmans’s injunction to be explored in future debates over the meaning
of data accuracy and the corresponding role of theory.
Future research must also come to terms with a second type of data feed-
back mechanism: the possibility that economic agents may want to change
oﬃcial statistics instead of changing their economic behavior. Where the
ﬁrst type of feedback described previously operates directly through the
choices of individual economic agents, the second operates indirectly
through collective choice in the political arena. The opportunity for the
political-economy feedback eﬀect arises because many of the relevant
macroeconomic statistics are produced by government agencies, and
agency budgets and programs are subject to the control of the executive
and legislative branches of the federal government, which, in turn, are
elected by the very agents whose welfare and decisions may be aﬀected by
the accuracy of the data.
The possibility that some agents may exert pressure through the politi-
cal process puts the issue of data accuracy on a slippery political slope. It
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statistical system should be insulated from the political process and reﬂect
only the experts’ assessment of best-practice measurement technique.
However, while this position may seem unassailable from the heights of the
ivory tower and, while it embodies a large dose of truth, it ignores the larger
reality of the national statistical system: like all other aspects of govern-
ment in a democratic system, a nation’s oﬃcial statistics are subject to the
consent of the governed. It is ultimately up to the governed to decide
whether to accept expert advice about statistics like the CPI (or, more ac-
curately, which expert’s advice to choose). The public may be well advised
to insulate the statistical system from the vicissitudes of politics, but it is
their choice to make.
The history of the CPI over the last decade again illustrates the impor-
tance of this political economy issues. Perhaps the most startling ﬁnding of
the Boskin Commission was the cost to the government of the estimated
CPI bias: approximately $1 trillion over twelve years in Social Security and
other COLAs based on the CPI. Taken as an unintended government out-
lay, the estimated bias would rank as one of the largest federal government
programs. Conversely, the consequence of removing the CPI bias to those
receiving COLAs or inﬂation escalators based on the CPI was equally $1
trillion. Surely those whose future pensions are reduced have a right to
know the reasons for the reduction and to challenge the expert opinion
supporting the change with their own analysis to tell their side of the story.
The implication of these political economy considerations for economic
measurement are illustrated by a National Research Council (NRC) com-
mittee empaneled to study the CPI in light of the Boskin Commission re-
port. The NRC report At What Price? (2002) produced two competing vi-
sions of the CPI, with diﬀerent implications for the distribution of Social
Security beneﬁts. The ﬁrst is based on the economic theory cost-of-living
index (COLI), the second on the traditional view of the CPI as a ﬁxed bas-
ket of products priced in successive periods, whose composition is updated
from time to time (termed by the NRC commission the “cost-of-goods in-
dex,” or COGI). The former seeks to ground the CPI as ﬁrmly as possible
in economic theory, following Koopmans, and provides conceptual sup-
port for the policy of reducing the bias in the CPI and thereby decreasing
COLAs based on the CPI. The COGI approach, on the other hand, focuses
on the shortcomings of theory (e.g., the near impossibility of aggregating
data derived from heterogenous consumers) and opts for the more heu-
ristic basis for the CPI—a Laspeyres index applied to a ﬁxed (or slowly
changing) market basket of goods and services. It thus provides conceptual
support for the larger COLAs of the pre-Greenspan–Boskin Commission
period.
The weight of opinion of the economics profession is undoubtedly on
the side of the COLI approach. This is the standard textbook solution, and
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public as a whole or, at least, with its representatives in Congress who ex-
ercise political oversight over the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It should be
remembered, in this regard, that the changes in the CPI precipitated by the
Boskin Commission emanated from the political process (the Senate Fi-
nance Committee), not the expert community of economists.
The “perceived credibility” standard was explicitly invoked by the NRC
report in its discussion of the use of price hedonic techniques in the CPI
program. It endorsed price hedonics as the most promising method for
adjusting CPI prices for changes in product quality, but also cautioned
the Bureau of Labor Statistics to proceed slowly in actually implementing
the technique because hedonic regressions sometimes produce “strange-
looking variable coeﬃcients [which] could be indicative of larger prob-
lems” (NRC 2002, 142). The NRC panel did not elaborate on this doctrine,
nor did it deﬁne “perceived credibility,” but it did comment that “it is hard
to know when a hedonic function is good enough for CPI work” (NRC
2002, 143). However, the report presumably has in mind both the need for
professional consensus on the “science” involved and acceptance of this
consensus by the public at large.
My own conclusion is that the doctrine of perceived credibility applies
to measurement issues far beyond its application by the NRC report to
price-hedonic problems (Hulten 2003). I have argued, more generally, that
the adage that “an old tax is a good tax” also applies to data. People adjust
their behavior in response to a tax, winners and losers are sorted out as the
tax matures, and changes are negotiated and unforeseen defects are ame-
liorated. A change in the statistical system operates in much the same way:
people adjust their behavior in light of the new data (the ﬁrst type of feed-
back eﬀect), and the modiﬁcations may be made as the data “matures” (the
second feedback eﬀect). The roles of the Boskin Commission and the NRC
panel should be seen in this light.
1.6 Conclusion
I conclude my tribute to Zvi Griliches with the observation that the qual-
ity of data mattered a lot to him. He was bothered by the propensity of
many empirical studies to use what he called “found data,” and knew that
the quality of the ingredients was at least as important as the method of
preparation, to use his own metaphor. He had an uncanny ability in semi-
nars to “sniﬀ” out bad “ingredients” even when they were artfully con-
cealed.
He was one of the few prominent economists insisting on the importance
of linking theory and measurement. This insistence was particularly im-
portant during the period in which academic interest in macroeconomic
data was on the wane. This situation has begun to change as the realization
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much as by inadequate theory, and (b) that problems of economic mea-
surement are often caused by inadequate theory.
The presence of potential feedback eﬀects makes the theory-measurement
nexus even more diﬃcult. As models of limited information penetrate
more deeply into the core of economic thinking, the importance of these
feedback eﬀects will become more and more apparent and will force theo-
rists to incorporate the issue of data accuracy into their theoretical models.
The ﬁeld of economic measurement, which Griliches nurtured with such
care and dedication, is (one hopes) set to bloom again.
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